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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL LAW - DOUBLE
JEOPARDY - UNDER "REQUIRED EVIDENCE" TEST, UNDERLYING ATTEMPTED ARMED ROBBERY MERGES UPON
CONVICTION FOR FELONY-MURDER. NEWTON v. STATE, 280
Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of th
United States Constitution 1 generally is perceived as prohibiting
successive prosecutions for the same offense. 2 Whether two particular crimes are the same offense 3 for double jeopardy purposes is of
practical significance for the criminal lawyer. A determination that
two otherwise separate offenses are the same in this context may
result in the merger of the lesser offense into the greater; only one
sentence may be imposed. In Newton v. State,4 the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, in a four-to-two decision, held that convictions in one

1. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, inter alia: "[No person shall] be subject for the

same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." While the Maryland
Constitution does not include a similar provision, there was an early recognition
that the double jeopardy prohibition was a part of the common law in Maryland.
Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 466, 121 A. 354, 355 (1923). The fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause was made applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
For an excellent discussion of the origins of the concept of double jeopardy
and its acceptance by American society, see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,
150-64 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting), and materials cited therein. See generally
Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 614-19, 373 A.2d 90, 96-98 (1977); Fisher,
Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CHI.
L. REV. 591, 603-04 (1961).
2. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 669 (1896); Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-69 (1873);
Comment, Double Jeopardy - Defining the Same Offense, 32 LA. L. REV. 87, 88
(1971); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 277-79 (1965). See, for an
interesting discussion of the same offenses in a multiple prosecution setting,
United States v. Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. 1079 (1978).
3. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873). A threshold question in any
discussion of double jeopardy is what makes one offense the same as another
within the meaning of the fifth amendment. See Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 196-201 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring); Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386, 388-93 (1958); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342-45 (1911);
Carroway, Pervasive Multiple Offense Problems - A Policy Analysis, 1971
UTAH L. REV. 105, 107-13; Note, The Protection From Multiple Trials, 11 STAN.
L. REV. 735, 741-46 (1959). Compare In re Nielson, 131 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1889)
(held that a second prosecution for an offense which was a "various incident" in
the prosecution of the first offense, unconstitutionally placed Nielsen twice in
jeopardy for the same offense) with Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 379-80
(1906) (stated that the offenses, to be deemed the same, must be the same both in
fact and in law).
4. 280 Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977).
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trial for attempted armed robbery and felony-murder 5 necessitated
6
merger of the former crime into the latter for sentencing purposes.
7
8
The majority and dissenting opinions in Newton differed, not
only in results, but also in the test applied to the merger issue. Both
opinions, however, purported to apply the "required evidence" test.9
The dissenting opinion
criticized the majority for applying the
"actual evidence" test. 10 The majority actually applied a hybrid of
the "required evidence" and "actual evidence" tests, while the
dissent applied a strict "required evidence" test. It is the purpose of
this Casenote to analyze in detail the majority and dissenting
opinions in Newton in light of other double jeopardy cases in
Maryland courts and in the United States Supreme Court. The
differences between the "required evidence" and "actual evidence"
tests shall be explained. The lines of the new hybrid test will then be
drawn.
II.

NEWTON'S CRIMES

Newton and a companion hailed and entered a taxicab. After the
cab proceeded a short distance, Newton's companion ordered the
cabdriver to stop the cab and informed him at gunpoint that he was
being robbed.' 1 Despite his offering no resistance, the cabdriver was
shot and killed.
The trial court found Newton guilty of felony-murder and
attempted armed robbery, 12 for which Newton received sentences of
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (Supp. 1977) provides:
All murder which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, any rape in any degree, sexual offense in the first or second
degree, sodomy, mayhem, robbery, burglary, kidnapping as defined in
§§ 337 and 338 of this article, storehouse breaking as defined in §§ 32 and
33 of this article, or daytime housebreaking as defined in § 30(b) of this
article, or in the escape or attempt to escape [from any penal institution]
shall be murder. in the first degree.
The felony-murder doctrine is of common law origin in Maryland. Evans v.
State, 28 Md. App. 640, 686 n.23, 349 A.2d 300, 329-30 n.23 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md.
197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). The statutory classification of felony-murder is found in
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 408-410 (1976 & Supp. 1977). Section 408 pertains to a
murder resulting from an arson, or its attempt, while § 409 refers to the burning
of or attempt to burn warehouse-type facilities.
6. 280 Md. at 273-74, 373 A.2d at 269-70.
7. Judge Eldridge delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Judges Singley,
Digges and Levine.
8. Chief Judge Murphy filed a dissenting opinion in which Judge Smith concurred.
9. See text accompanying note 17 infra.
10. 280 Md. at 276-77, 373 A.2d at 271. See text accompanying note 22 infra.
11. 280 Md. at 262, 373 A.2d at 263.
12. Id. at 262, 373 A.2d at 263.
The trial court also convicted Newton of handgun violations as to the felonymurder and the attempted armed robbery. The legislative intent behind the
handgun section, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(d) (1976), is quite clear;
conviction is punishable as a separate misdemeanor by a maximum of fifteen
years imprisonment, with a minimum of five years. Ford v. State, 274 Md. 546,
337 A.2d 81 (1975); Raley v. State, 32 Md. App. 515, 363 A.2d 261 (1976). This
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life imprisonment and twenty years, respectively. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland 13 affirmed both convictions and held
that the attempted armed robbery conviction did not merge into the
15
felony-murder conviction. 14 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed and directed that Newton's conviction and sentence for
attempted armed robbery be vacated.

III. THE REQUIRED EVIDENCE AND ACTUAL
EVIDENCE TESTS
An examination of the "required evidence" test and the "actual
evidence" test provides the background for a complete comprehension of double jeopardy merger cases. The United States Supreme
the "required evidence" rule in Blockburger v. United
Court stated
6
States:'
The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction

constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
requires
offenses or only one, is whether each provision
17

proof of a fact which the other does not.

section was again scrutinized in Couplin v. State, 37 Md. App. 567, 378 A.2d 197

(1977). There, the appellant argued that the use of a handgun in the commission

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

of a crime of violence merged with robbery with a deadly weapon to prevent a
conviction of the latter offense. Applying the "required evidence" test, the court
of special appeals held that robbery with a deadly weapon required proof of a
robbery while the handgun violation required that a handgun be used in the
commission of a crime of violence. As each required proof of a fact which the
other did not (regardless of whether the actual evidence adduced at trial showed
that the robbery with a deadly weapon was committed with a handgun), the two
offenses did not merge. Id. at 579-82, 378 A.2d at 204-05. Accord, Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 558 F.2d 691, 695-96 (3d Cir. 1977); Coates v.
Maryland, 436 F. Supp. 226, 231-33 (D. Md. 1977); Jones v. Commonwealth, 218
Va. 18, 21-24, 235 S.E.2d 313, 315-16 (1977). See United States v. Crew, 538 F.2d
575, 577-78 (4th Cir. 1977). Contra, United States v. Simpson, 98 S. Ct. 909, 913
(1978).
31 Md. App. 344, 356 A.2d 274 (1976).
The court admitted that Newton's position was "somewhat persuasive," id. at
348, 356 A.2d at 276, but stated, without analysis, that murder and attempted
armed robbery simply were not the same crime.
280 Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977).
284 U.S. 299 (1932).
Id. at 304, quoted in Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 266, 373 A.2d 262, 265 (1977).
Sometimes referred to as the "same evidence" test, this standard was first
enunciated in The King v. Vandercomb & Abbott, 69 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (1796).
The test was first used in this country by Judge Gray in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. (12 Browne) 433 (1871):
The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same
act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offence. A
single act may be an offence against two statutes; and if each statute
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the
defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.
Id. at 434. This language was approved by the Supreme Court in Gavieres v.
United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911). Compare lannelli v. United States, 420
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The "required evidence" test focuses on whether the elements of the
lesser offense are necessarily included in the elements of the greater
offense.1 8 By definition, the lesser offense must be committed in the
course of committing the greater offense. For example, assault
merges with assault with intent to murder, 19 robbery merges with
armed robbery, 2° and larceny merges with robbery. 21 Since this test
views the elements of both crimes in the abstract only, it does not
take into account the actual evidence used at trial to prove the
existence of the crimes.
The "actual evidence" test, 22 on the other hand, focuses on

whether the evidence adduced at trial to prove the lesser offense is
an integral part of the evidence used to prove the greater offense.
This test was explicitly rejected by the United States Supreme Court
in Harrisv. United States, 23 and thus, it is relevant only in so far as
it dilutes the application of the pure "required evidence" test in
particular cases. The "actual evidence" test generally is infused into
a merger case when the judge believes that fairness requires that
more be taken into consideration than only the abstract elements of
the offenses in his case.
The first analysis of the modern merger concept in a felonymurder situation in Maryland 24 came in a trilogy of cases beginning
with Parker v. State.25 The court of special appeals in Parkerheld

that the doctrine of merger was not applicable to convictions for
felony-murder and armed robbery. 26 The court stressed the distinct
elements of robbery and murder, and emphasized that each crime
arose from a different act:

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975) and Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 388-93 (1958)
(pursuant to the Blockburger test, strictly construed various gambling, Iannelli,
and narcotic, Gore, violations as non-merging) with United States v. Simpson, 98
S. Ct. 909, 910-15 (1978) and Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 323-29 (1957)
(construed the congressional intent behind various sections concerning bank
robbery while armed as merging). 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 2113(a) and (d) (1976). Cf.
United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 120-21 n.9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
434 (1977) (court agreed there was no double jeopardy violation because trier of
fact had found the two attempted bank robberies were distinct criminal
transactions).
Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 276-77, 373 A.2d 262, 270-71 (1977) (Murphy, C.J.,
dissenting). See lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785-86 n.17 (1975).
E.g., Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 114, 118, 250 A.2d 272, 274 (1969).
E.g., Tender v. State, 2 Md. App. 692, 698-700, 237 A.2d 65, 69-71 (1968).
E.g., Wiggins v. State, 8 Md. App. 598, 603-04, 261 A.2d .503, 506-07 (1970);
Halcomb v. State, 6 Md. App. 32, 37, 250 A.2d 119, 121-22 (1969).
The "actual evidence" test determines whether two offenses are the same based
upon the evidence actually offered, finding a merger if there is substantial
similarity in proof. See District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17, 21-22 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) (Rutledge, J., concurring). Judge Rutledge, later an Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, applied a two-tiered analysis using both a
"required evidence" test and the "actual evidence" test.
359 U.S. 19 (1959).
But see Robinson v. State, 249 Md. 200, 207-11, 238 A.2d 875, 880-82, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 928 (1968).
7 Md. App. 167, 254 A.2d 381 (1969).
Id. at 199, 254 A.2d at 398.
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The act of taking property from a person by means of force
and fear is separate and distinct from the act of firing shots
that kill him, even though evidence as to the robbery is
27
admissible as to the murder.
The Parkercourt did not discuss merger specifically with regard to
double jeopardy; rather, it dealt with the common law concept of
28
merger.
One year later in McChan v. State,29 the court of special appeals
articulated the same rationale as it had in Parker,but addressed its
opinion to an argument based specifically on double jeopardy.
McChan, convicted of felony-murder and armed robbery, contended
that the underlying felony merged into the felony-murder upon
conviction. McChan urged that the double jeopardy clause thus
3°
prohibited a conviction and sentence for the armed robbery.
Relying totally on Parker, the court affirmed both convictions.
In 1971, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Price v. State,3 1
carried the Parker-McChan theory one step further. Price was
convicted of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of
arson. 32 In both Parker and McChan, the court of special appeals
had relied heavily on the fact that the underlying felony was a
"separate and distinct" 33 act from the murder. The court of appeals
in Price could not rely solely on such reasoning in an arson-murder
situation. Concluding that there was a "single, indivisible criminal
act, '34 the act of burning, the court of appeals applied a two-step
process to determine whether the arson was a lesser included offense
which merged upon conviction of the felony-murder. The court
looked first at each act and then examined the "thrust" 35 of each
27. Id. at 199, 254 A.2d at 399.
28. Id. at 199, 254 A.2d at 398-99. But cf. Massey v. State, 7 Md. App. 615, 256 A.2d
614 (1969) (held that convictions of assault with intent to rob and of assault
merged into a conviction of robbery on the facts presented). Judge Orth, who
authored the court's opinion in Parker,concurred in Massey, stressing that the
applicability of the doctrine of merger is determined by whether one crime
"necessarily involves the other." Id. at 618, 256 A.2d at 615-16. Veney v. State,
227 Md. 608, 612, 177 A.2d 883, 886 (1962), and Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464,
468-70, 121 A. 354, 356 (1923), provide an in-depth discussion on the common law
doctrine of merger. This concept was abrogated, Green v. State, 243 Md. 75, 80,
220 A.2d 131, 135 (1966); Bennett v. State, 229 Md. 208, 212, 182 A.2d 815, 817-18
(1962), and a more modern concept of merger was adopted, which focused on
whether the lesser offense was a necessary ingredient of the greater offense.
Veney v. State, 227 Md. 608, 612, 177 A.2d 883, 886 (1962); Williams v. State, 205
Md. 470, 475-79, 109 A.2d 89, 92-94 (1954).
29. 9 Md. App. 311, 264 A.2d 130 (1970).
30. Id. at 315, 264 A.2d at 133.
31. 261 Md. 573, 277 A.2d 256 (1971).
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 408 (1976) classifies any murder committed during the
perpetration of an arson as first degree murder. See note 5 supra.
33. McChan v. State, 9 Md. App. 311, 316, 264 A.2d 130, 133 (1970); Parker v. State, 7
Md. App. 167, 199, 254 A.2d 381, 399 (1969).
34. 261 Md. at 579, 277 A.2d at 259.
35. Id.
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offense. Because the "thrust" of arson and the "thrust" of murder
were distinct, the former 37"directed against property" 36 and the latter
"against an individual," merger was not appropriate. The offenses
were "separate and parallel . . . neither being a 'lesser included'

offense within the other. '3 The court of appeals, then, strove to
change the focus of merger cases from looking only at the acts
involved to examining the "thrust" of the offenses. While the court's
language was not entirely clear, Price did adopt the Parker-McChan
conclusion and implied that the doctrine of
merger was not
39
applicable beyond the most obvious situations.
In Cousins v. State,40 and Thomas v. State,4 1 the court of appeals
approved the application of the "required evidence" test to determine
if two offenses were the same for double jeopardy purposes. 42 In both
cases, the court provided an extensive history of the formulation of
the test, its continued use by the United States Supreme Court, 43 and
its effect upon the doctrine of merger in Maryland. 44
The significance of Cousins lies in the Maryland Court of
Appeals' refusal to adopt the "same transaction" test

45

advocated by

Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall in their concurring
opinion in Ashe v. Swenson. 46 The "same transaction" test merges
the underlying felony into the felony-murder47 if both offenses arose
from a single episode or factual occurrence.
36. Id. at 580, 277 A.2d at 260. In practical application, Price would have the same

results as strict use of the "required evidence" test.

37. Id.
38. Id.

39. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
40. 277 Md. 383, 354 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
41. 277 Md. 257, 353 A.2d 240 (1976).

42. See generally note 17 supra and accompanying text.
43. E.g., Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 261-66, 353 A.2d 240, 243-46 (1976).
44. Id. at 266-69, 353 A.2d at 246-48.
45. 277 Md. 383, 389-97, 354 A.2d 824, 829-33 (1976). Adoption of the "same

transaction" test "would compel the prosecution to join all offenses arising from
a single criminal act, episode or transaction in a single trial." Id. at 390, 354 A.2d
at 830. It has been rejected by the Supreme Court in past years, Morgan v.
Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 641 (1915), and by a majority of the present Court, Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). The rationale behind the test is to expand the
protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause. See Carey v. State, 37 Md.
App. 689, 693-94, 379 A.2d 178, 180-81 (1977). See generally Carroway, Pervasive
Multiple Offense Problems - A Policy Analysis, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 105, 112-19,
126-30; Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy,58 YALE L.J.
513 (1949); Note, The Protection From Multiple Trials, 11 STAN. L. REV. 735,
743-46 (1969); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 275-77 (1965); Note,
Double Jeopardy and the Multiple-Count Indictment, 57 YALE L.J. 132, 137-38
(1947); Note, 37 MD. L. REV. 112 (1977).
46. 397 U.S. 436, 448-60 (1970). For other examples of the continuing effort by
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall to persuade a majority of the Court of the
necessity for adoption of the "same transaction" test, see Harris v. Oklahoma,
433 U.S. 682, 683 (1977) (Brennan, Marshall, J.J., concurring); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 429 U.S. 1053, 1053-54 (1977) (Brennan, Marshall, J.J., dissenting
from denial of writ of certiorari).
47. See note 45 supra.
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Thomas was decided upon the first unarticulated use of a hybrid
merger test. In that case, which involved successive prosecutions,
the court of appeals reversed a conviction for unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle, 48 concluding that all of the elements of that offense
were contained in the offense of driving a vehicle without consent of
the owner, 49 of which Thomas had been convicted previously. The
second conviction was prohibited by what the court called the
"required evidence" test, but only because the evidence adduced at
trial to prove Thomas guilty of unauthorized use was identical to the
evidence adduced at trial in the first conviction."° The court held that
the two offenses, while "not precisely the same ' 51 elementally, would
be considered the same for the purposes of the double jeopardy
clause. 52 This conclusion was hardly the result of a strict application
of the "required evidence" test. In fact, it appears to have been an
application to some extent of the "actual evidence" test, as the court
examined the theory under which the state prosecuted Thomas and
viewed the evidence adduced at trial. The court, in applying a hybrid
version of the "required evidence" test, provided the background for
the holding in Newton.
IV.

NEWTON ANALYSIS

In interpreting the "required evidence" test in Newton, the court
of appeals concluded that if the elements of one offense necessarily
required "proof sufficient to establish the underlying [offense],"5 3
then the underlying offense merged into the greater offense. 54 The
majority noted that to obtain a felony-murder conviction the
prosecution must prove two sets of elements. First, the prosecution is
required to prove every element of the specific felony or its attempt. 55
Secondly, the prosecution must prove a resulting death having a
"direct causal connection" 56 to the underlying felony. If these two
sets of elements are compared, it becomes obvious that the "only
additional fact necessary to secure the first degree murder conviction
[upon the felony-murder theory], which [was] not necessary to secure
a conviction for the underlying felony, [was] proof of death. '5 7
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 349 (1976). "The offense can be established either by
showing an entry and a taking or by showing a taking of the vehicle from
wherever it may be located." Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 269, 353 A.2d 240, 248
(1976).
49. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66'/2, § 4-102 (1970) (now amended and codified in MD.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 14-102 (1977)).
50. Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 270, 353 A.2d 240, 248 (1976).
51. Id.
52. Id. People v. Gray, 69 Ill. 2d 44, 51-52, 370 N.E.2d 797, 800 (1977).
53. 280 Md. at 273 n.2, 373 A.2d at 269 n.2.
54. Id. at 269, 373 A.2d at 267.
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 408-410 (1976 & Supp. 1977). See note 5 supra.
56. Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640, 644, 313 A.2d 563, 566 (1974).
57. Newton v. State, 280 Md. at 269, 373 A.2d at 267.
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Proof of the underlying felony relieved the prosecution of the
burden of establishing other elements normally required to prove
first degree murder, 58 namely, premeditation, willfulness, and
deliberateness. 59 Therefore, proof of the underlying felony was an
alternative set of elements in proving first degree murder, only
demanded, however, by a felony-murder theory. Under this alternative mode of proving first degree murder, the abstract elements of
first degree murder are conspicuously absent; no proof of premeditation, willfulness, and deliberateness, as conceived in ordinary first
degree murder cases, are required.
When not employing a felony-murder theory, the elements of
attempted armed robbery and the elements of murder are not
identical. 60 This contradiction, an obvious merging of elements
under felony-murder, as opposed to an irreconcilable set of nonmerging elements under ordinary first degree murder and attempted
armed robbery, that the dissent in Newton addressed.
This conflict is no easier to resolve in light of the clear import of
the double jeopardy clause 6- to prevent multiple punishment for the
"same punishable offense. 1 The Newton majority, in attempting to
resolve this conflict, equivocated. It applied the "required evidence"
test not in a vacuum, but with a careful view of the offenses and
their "various incidents,' 62 disclosed as the proof unfolded. This
application was made more palatable by the circumstances in
Newton. Only one offense in this felony-murder situation, the
murder, required proof of a fact, a death, which the other, the felony,
did not.63 Under such analysis the underlying felony merged into the
murder. Newton, although couched in terms of the "required
evidence" test, may be read as setting forth a hybrid test. This
hybrid test may have offered a facile means of resolving the Newton
appeal, but it may prove difficult to employ in future cases involving
merger of offenses.
In most of the other jurisdictions which have held that an
underlying felony merged under the "required evidence" test upon
58. This requirement is normal in the sense that unless a murder is committed in the
perpetration of certain enumerated felonies, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§408-410
(1976 & Supp. 1977), the state must prove that the killing was premeditated,
willful and deliberate in order to obtain a first degree murder conviction. The
intent to commit the underlying felony supplants the intent aspect of malice
necessary for a first degree murder conviction. Warren v. State, 29 Md. App. 560,
565-67, 350 A.2d 173, 177-79 (1976).
59. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407 (1976) provides: "[A]ll murder which shall be
perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait, or by any kind of willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing shall be murder in the first degree."
60. Newton v. State, 280 Md. at 270-71, 373 A.2d at 267-68, (quoting State v.
Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 215-16, 185 S.E.2d 666, 675 (1972)).
61. Note, The ProtectionFrom Multiple Trials, 11 STAN. L. REV. 735, 738 (1959). See
Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873); note 3 supra.
62. In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889).
63. Newton v. State, 280 Md. at 269, 373 A.2d at 267.
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conviction of the felony-murder, the courts have emphasized two
factors: that the underlying felony "was an essential and indispensable element in the State's proof of murder, '64 and, that the
"gravamen" of the offense was the murder and not the underlying
felony which precipitated the murder. 65 Regardless of how they have
arrived at the conclusion that the underlying felony merged, the
courts in all of the cases reaching that result have taken note of the
proof adduced at trial and the factual situation in which the
66
respective crimes were committed.
The Newton dissent based its argument on the theory that
felony-murder was but a "species of murder in the first degree [and]
not . . . a new crime." 67 Under this view, those sections of the
Maryland Annotated Code which pertained to first degree murder 68
merely listed and classified different methods by which a homicide
was deemed to be first degree murder. In the dissent's interpretation,
while each section might well have required different proof,69 this

did not change the nature of the crime itself. Thus, a conviction of
first degree murder could have been obtained without proving an
attempted armed robbery. The necessary elements of each crime
were "manifestly different and distinct; each crime [could] be proved
independently of the other. '7 0 The dissent charged that the majority
had, in reality, applied the "actual evidence" test, 71 which was
specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Harris v. United
States,72 and that the majority had found a merger based "on the
64. State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 215, 185 S.E.2d 666, 675 (1972); accord, State ex
rel. Wikberg v. Henderson, 292 So. 2d 505, 509 (La. 1974); People v. Anderson, 62
Mich. App. 475, 483, 233 N.W.2d 620, 624 (1975). See note 92 infra.
65. E.g., State ex rel. Wikberg v. Henderson, 292 So. 2d 505, 508-09 (La. 1974).
66. E.g., People v. Anderson, 62 Mich. App. 475, 233 N.W.2d 620 (1975), in which the
court could not determine whether the first degree murder conviction was based
on an armed robbery pursuant to a felony-murder theory, or independent of that
underlying felony. The court felt obligated to resolve any doubt in favor of the
defendant. Id. at 482, 233 N.W.2d at 623-24. Accord, Frye v. State, 37 Md. App.
476, 378 A.2d 155 (1977). Contra, Godwin v. State, 38 Md. App. 716, 382 A.2d 596
(1977). See text accompanying notes 97 & 107 infra.
67. 280 Md. at 276, 373 A.2d at 270. At common law, all homicides were either
murder or manslaughter. While further codification subdivided homicide into
first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter and although the
felony-murder variety of first degree murder was codified, nevertheless felonymurder was not made a new crime. See Wood v. State, 191 Md. 658, 666-69, 62
A.2d 576, 579-80 (1948); Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 686 n.23, 349 A.2d 300,
329-30 n.23 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). See generally Davis v.
State, 39 Md. 355, 374 (1874).
68. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§407-10 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
69. While the Newton dissenters acknowledged the distinction in proof necessary to
convict for premeditated murder as opposed to conviction for murder in the
perpetration of a robbery, they would not, in construing the "required evidence"
test, apply this or any distinction with regard to proof. 280 Md. at 275-77, 373
A.2d at 270-71. See notes 74-78 and accompanying text infra.
70. 280 Md. at 276, 373 A.2d at 270.
71. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
72. 359 U.S. 19 (1959).
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actual evidence adduced at trial . . .rather than on the elements

generally required to establish [the] crime. ' 73 The "required
evidence" test, the dissent implied, was to be applied to the elements
of the respective offenses as they existed in the abstract, either
before or at the time of trial, and not as the evidence unfolded. Thus,
in applying this strict "required evidence" test, the dissent would
find that attempted armed robbery did not merge into first degree
murder, regardless of whether the state ultimately decided to
prosecute pursuant to the felony-murder doctrine, sought to prove
premeditation, willfulness, and deliberateness, or employed both
theories.
The dissent cited a number of cases in which other courts
adopted a strict construction of the "required evidence" test in a
felony-murder situation.7 4 The dissent claimed that the cases
represented "the clear weight of authority in the country. 7 5 In State
v. Hall,76 the Idaho Supreme Court succinctly stated what, in this

view, is the crux of the issue. The underlying felony and the murder
were, in the Hall court's opinion, separate offenses regardless of the
factual setting in which they occurred. Because a murder, for
example, could have taken place without a robbery, the robbery
would only have been a "condition or circumstance characterizing
the murder a first degree." 77 Under this view, unless each offense
has elements necessarily included in the other, making both offenses
the same in law as well as fact,78 the offenses do not merge
regardless of the evidence. The underlying felony is not an element
of the felony-murder; otherwise, "the elements of [felony-murder]
'79
would be as various as the underlying felonies might be."

In some of the cases cited by the dissent in Newton, the courts
implicitly relied on a presumed legislative intent behind their
respective states' felony-murder statutes.8° A legislature may well
73. 280 Md. at 276, 373 A.2d at 271. See generally United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d
909, 913 (2d Cir. 1961); Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 265 n.4, 353 A.2d 240, 245
n.4 (1976). See also Carroway, Pervasive Multiple Offense Problems - A Policy
Analysis, 1971 UTAH. L. REV. 105, 108-09.
74. E.g., Turner v. State, 248 Ark. 367, 452 S.W.2d 317 (1970), rev'd on other grounds,
407 U.S. 366 (1972); State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 383 P.2d 602 (1963); State v.
Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976); People v.
Tutuska, 19 Misc. 2d 308, 192 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1959); Harris v. State, 555 P.2d 76
(Okla. Crim. App. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 682 (1977); State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d
234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940).
75. 280 Md. at 275, 373 A.2d at 270.
76. 86 Idaho 63, 383 P.2d 602 (1963).
77. Id. at 69, 383 P.2d at 606. The dissenters in Newton also felt that evidence of the
underlying felony only took the place of malice and was not an element of the
murder. 280 Md. at 281, 373 A.2d at 273.
78. State v. Hall, 86 Idaho at 69-70, 383 P.2d at 606.
79. People v. Tutuska, 19 Misc. 2d 308, 314, 192 N.Y.S.2d 350, 357 (1959).
80. E.g., State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77-78, 342 A.2d 841, 845 (1975). See Carmody v.
Seventh Judicial District Court, 81 Nev. 83, 85, 398 P.2d 706, 707 (1965); People v.
Tutuska, 19 Misc. 2d 308, 314, 192. N.Y.S.2d 350, 357 (1959).
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have intended in a statutory definition of felony-murder that there
be a separate punishment in each step leading to the completion of
the crime.8 ' Since each offense focuses on a different act, albeit
perhaps in one transaction, each crime can be proved without the
other. Determining that one offense is necessarily included in
another within the meaning of the "required evidence" test does not
mean that the lesser offense is merely an aspect of the major offense
or a link in a chain leading to one result only. Rather, the lesser
offense, by the legal definition of that offense, must be committed in
the course of committing the greater offense.
The Newton dissent would not have found a merger beyond the
most obvious situations.8 2 If, indeed, a primary purpose of the double
jeopardy clause "is to limit [the] discretion of courts and prosecutors, ' '8 3 such a strict application of the "required evidence" test does

not foster such a purpose.
Recently, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Ohio,8 4 and Harris v.

Oklahoma,8 5 took an even more expansive view of what makes two
offenses one in law. Both cases involved successive prosecutions. In
Harris,the Court held that since a conviction of felony-murder was
dependent upon a conviction of a lesser crime - in that case,
robbery with firearms - the lesser crime merged upon conviction of
the greater.8 6 The Court concluded that a "person [who] has been
tried and convicted for a crime which has various incidents included
in it, . . . cannot be a second time tried for one of those incidents

without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

87

81. Two recent decisions, Whalen v. United States, 379 A.2d 1152 (D.C. 1977), and
Blango v. United States, 373 A.2d 885 (D.C. 1977), provide an interesting
analysis of the congressional intent behind the District of Columbia's felonymurder statute, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2401 (1973). Whalen, which was decided
over four months after the Supreme Court decided Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S.
682 (1977), ignored the underlying rationale of that decision - that the
underlying felony merges upon conviction of felony-murder. Stressing the
societal interest in each of the crimes, the underlying felony and the murder, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals allowed both convictions to stand. Whalen
v. United States, 379 A.2d at 1158-60; Blango v. United States, 373 A.2d at
888-89; accord, Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960, 970-72 (Alaska 1977); Harris v.
United States, 377 A.2d 34, 38 (D.C. 1977); State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77-78, 342
A.2d 841, 845 (1975); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 302-13 (1965).
See also Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960, 970-72 (Alaska 1977); Commonwealth v.
Sparrow, 471 Pa. 490, 502-07, 370 A.2d 712, 718-21 (1977).
82. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
83. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 302 (1965).
84. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
85. 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
86. Id. at 682-83. The decision from the Oklahoma court was cited by Chief Judge
Murphy in his dissent in Newton as representative of the majority of
jurisdictions which allowed convictions and sentences both for the felony-murder
and the underlying felony. 280 Md. at 275 n.1, 373 A.2d at 270 n.1.
87. 433 U.S. at 683 (citing In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889)). See text
accompanying note 62 supra.
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In Brown, the Court began its discussion by stating that for
double jeopardy purposes, the identity of offenses did not depend on
exact identity either of elements or of proof necessary to convict a
defendant. 8 The facts of Brown were extremely similar to those of
Thomas. In Brown, the defendant was charged in one municipal
89
locale with "taking or operating a car without the owner's consent"
and subsequently charged in another locale with auto theft.9 The
Court, applying what it claimed to be the "required evidence" test,
concluded that since the lesser offense contained no elements other
than those of the greater offense, the two offenses were the same for
double jeopardy purposes. 91 The Court's holdings in Harris and
Brown have seriously diminished the vitality of the strict "required
evidence" test. Although the Supreme Court claimed to have applied
the "required evidence" test, the Court, like the court of appeals,
appears in fact to have used a modified version of the "actual
evidence" test.
The exact shape of the proper test has not yet been settled. The
majority of the Supreme Court, the majority judges in Newton, and
the Newton dissenters agree that the "required evidence" test is
the constitutional standard; nevertheless, the prevailing test is
clearly not the "required evidence" test in its strict form. That
strict test was the standard advocated by the dissent in Newton,
namely that two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes
only if, before trial, all the elements of one offense are necessarily
included in the other offense. The majority in Newton, in a view
subsequently bolstered by both Harris v. Oklahoma and Brown,
would not construe double jeopardy in a restrictive manner, such as
looking solely at the elements of the crimes on paper. While Harrisv.
United States, which rejected the "actual evidence" test, has never
explicitly been overruled, the Newton majority and the majority of
Supreme Court justices would to some extent take cognizance of the
proof as well as the elements of the crimes. The "actual evidence"
test has not been implemented fully, but the nature of the proof
offered at trial is no longer meaningless in determining the merger
92
of offenses.
A hybrid test appears to be emerging. The test examines first,
whether all the elements of a lesser offense, such as an underlying
felony, are necessarily included in the elements of a greater offense,
such as felony-murder. If they are not, the text examines, secondly,
whether the elements of the lesser offense are "various incident[s]" 93
88. 432 U.s. at 164.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 162.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 167-69.
E.g., Brooks v. State, 38 Md. App. 550, 552-53, 381 A.2d 718, 720-21 (1978)
(certiorari was granted by the court of appeals on March 23, 1978 (No. 469)).
People v. Gray, 69 Ill. 2d 44, 51-52, 370 N.E.2d 797, 800 (1977).

93. See text accompanying notes 62 & 87 supra.
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in the proof of the greater offense. This hybrid test, if adopted, would
effectuate the purpose of the double jeopardy clause. It would not
rely on the actual evidence adduced and would stop far short of
adopting the "same transaction" test. It would allow a court to read
the double9 4jeopardy clause in the expansive manner which is
warranted.

Questions remain about the implementation of the Newton
merger theory. One vital question, alluded to but not definitively
answered in Newton, concerns the situation in which a jury
considers a first degree murder charge tried upon a theory of
premeditation, willfulness, and deliberateness, 95 as well as upon a
felony-murder theory. 96 In the recent case of Frye v. State,97 the court
of special appeals considered the application of a Newton dictum
that if the evidence is sufficient for a jury to find premeditated
murder, and the theory upon which the jury convicts is not
articulated or manifested upon a verdict sheet, 98 the offenses do not
merge. 99 The state in Frye relied upon this dictum and also upon
Robinson v. State.100 In Robinson, evidence was presented and
submitted to the jury upon both a premeditated and felony-murder
theory. The court of appeals held that, taking into consideration all
the evidence, the jury's verdict in all probability'0 1 reflected a finding
of a premeditated, willful, and deliberate murder. The Frye court, in
an opinion by Chief Judge Gilbert, incorporated the portion which
appears in italics in the Newton dicta:
If.

.

. the murder conviction is premised upon independent

proof of wilfulness, premeditation and deliberation under
§ 407, or if the evidence is sufficient for a jury [underproper
advisory instructionsfrom the court] to find those elements,
the offenses do not merge. Each offense would then require
proof of facts which the
other did not, and convictions on
10 2
both would be proper.

94. See generally Carroway, Pervasive Multiple Offense Problems - A Policy
Analysis, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 105, 118-19; Note, Twice in Jeopardy,75 YALE L.J.
262, 311-21 (1965); Note, Consecutive Sentences in Single Prosecutions:Judicial
Multiplication of Statutory Penalties, 67 YALE L.J. 916, 924-31 (1958).
95. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 5 & 55 supra and accompanying text.
97. 37 Md. App. 476, 378 A.2d 155 (1977). The court of appeals granted certiorarion
December 23, 1977.
98. The verdict sheet is helpful to both the jury and the trial judge, especially where
a number of issues are submitted to the jury. The sheet reflects the offenses the
jury is to consider; the jury checks "guilty" or "not guilty" as to each crime. This
tends to create less confusion both for the jury in deliberating and for the trial
judge in instructing.
99. Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 269, 373 A.2d 262, 267 (1977).
100. 249 Md. 200, 238 A.2d 875, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 928 (1968).
101. Id. at 209, 238 A.2d at 881.
102. 37 Md. App. at 479, 378 A.2d at 156 (emphasis in original) (quoting in part
Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 269, 373 A.2d 262, 267 (1977)).
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The court stated further that when there is sufficient evidence of
both a premeditated and a felony-murder, the trial judge should
instruct the jury to indicate specifically under which theory its
verdict is based, where there is a finding of first degree murder. The
court reasoned that in any felony-murder situation there would be
some independent evidence of premeditation. 10 3 If the jury's verdict
were based on a felony-murder, a guilty verdict upon the underlying
felony would merge into the murder, precluding the imposition of
another sentence based on the underlying felony.10 4 Without such an
instruction, the court concluded, it could not determine under which
theory the jury returned its verdict.10 5 The court "resolve[d] the doubt
in favor of the appellant" 10 6 and vacated the conviction of the
underlying felony. The Frye court required, in order to avoid a
merger under Newton, the specific articulation of the jury's theory,
and set forth a procedure for a trial judge to follow when both
theories of first degree murder are considered by a jury.
The clarity of Frye soon was destroyed, however, by another
court of special appeals case, Godwin v. State.10 7 The court, in an
opinion by Judge Moylan, indicated that under the circumstances,
the first degree murder verdicts returned by the jury without
articulation of the theory behind them had to have been based upon
premeditation and not felony-murder, even though both theories
were submitted to the jury. In refusing to hold that Godwin's
kidnapping convictions merged into his murder convictions, the
court found the evidence of premeditation so overwhelming that
"[u]nder the circumstances of this case, a merger of the convictions
[was] not remotely called for."1083 While the court in Godwin placed
more emphasis on the sordid facts than did the court in Frye, the
Godwin court could have been no more certain of the jury's rationale.
Whether Godwin incorrectly restricts Newton or whether Frye
103. 37 Md. App. at 479, 378 A.2d at 156.
104. Id. at 480, 378 A.2d at 157.

105. Id. Accord, People v. Anderson, 62 Mich. App. 475, 233 N.W.2d 620 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Sparrow, 471 Pa. 490, 516-22, 370 A.2d 712, 726-29 (1977)
(Nix, J., dissenting).

106. 37 Md. App. at 480, 378 A.2d at 157.
107. 38 Md. App. 716, 382 A.2d 596 (1977). Godwin was filed on November 14, 1977,
one month after Frye.
Godwin was originally reported in 379 A.2d 754 (1977). An explanation was
added by Judge Moylan distinguishing Frye and relying on Robinson v. State,
249 Md. 200, 238 A.2d 875, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 928 (1968), thus necessitating the

latter citation, 382 A.2d 596 (1977).
108. Godwin v. State, 38 Md. App. at 737, 382 A.2d at 608. The identical conclusion,
based upon the same factual circumstances, was reached in Jones v. State, 38
Md. App. 288, 303-05, 380 A.2d 659, 668 (1977). The state, in appealing Frye, see

note 97 supra, has taken the position that merger should occur only if the sole
possible rationale for the first degree murder verdict is a felony-murder theory.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3-6. See Pulley v. State, 38 Md. App. 682, 691,

382 A.2d 621, 626-27 (1978); Commonwealth v. Sparrow, 471 Pa. 490, 502-07, 370
A.2d 712, 718-21 (1977).
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unnecessarily broadens the scope of Newton remains to be
determined by the court of appeals. If a liberal construction of the
double jeopardy clause with respect to the merger of offenses is
necessary pursuant to Newton, then the Frye court would seem to
have taken the proper approach.
Another question which remains unanswered concerns the
situation in which the trier of fact convicts on a felony-murder
theory where there are a number of underlying felonies. Do all of the
underlying felonies merge - some - or just one? Using the rationale

of Frye and the "required evidence" test, all of the underlying
offenses connected to or which could have served as a basis for a
finding of felony-murder would be merged into the murder conviction.
In any criminal trial in which multiple offenses of a potentially
merging nature have been submitted to the jury and the jury returns
a guilty verdict as to each, Frye necessitates that the judge, prior to
sentencing, merge the lesser offense into the greater ones if the
"required evidence" test so dictates. Where the trial judge does not
sua sponte merge the offenses, the Newton rule clearly would
sanction a motion to correct an illegal sentence, 10 9 or a direct appeal
to the court of special appeals grounded on the illegality in
sentencing. The most pronounced practical effect of Newton,
however, probably will be in the context of collateral review'1 0 of
previously finalized homicide cases tried upon a felony-murder
theory. Although neither the courts of appeals nor the court of
special appeals yet has considered whether Newton must be applied
retroactively, retroactive application appears necessary under
accepted principles."'

109. MD. RuLE 774(a) (1977). This provision gives the trial court the power to correct
an illegal sentence at any time.
110. In Maryland, collateral review is generally conducted under the Post Conviction
Procedure Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645(A) (Supp. 1977). See Jourdan v.
State, 275 Md. 495, 341 A.2d 388 (1975) (held that, absent an effective waiver, a
claim of double jeopardy could be raised on post conviction).
111. Courts generally apply a three-pronged test to determine whether a ruling on
constitutional grounds should be applied retroactively. "The criteria guiding
resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new
standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967);
accord, Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507-11 (1973); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 627-29, 636 (1965); Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 718, 344 A.2d 80,
96-97 (1975) (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The majority in Wiggins held that
"retroactive application is mandated, (1) where the old rule affected the integrity
of the fact-finding process, (2) where no trial was constitutionally permissible,

and (3) where the punishment is not constitutionally permissible." 275 Md. at
701, 344 A.2d at 87 (emphasis supplied). Because an underlying felony merges
upon conviction of felony-murder, any punishment of the underlying felony is
prohibited.
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V. CONCLUSION
Newton marks the ascendancy of a new approach to merger. The
court of appeals, while reaffirming the use of the "required evidence"
test, also examined the evidence adduced at trial. This approach
stops short of adopting the "actual evidence" test, but allows a court
some flexibility in determining if two offenses are to be deemed the
same for double jeopardy purposes. That flexibiliy allows the court to
to
effectuate the essential reason for the double jeopardy clause - 112
prevent a person from twice being convicted for the same offense.
Michael W. Prokopik

112. See text accompanying note 61 supra.

